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H. Thomas Johnson 
Businesses need information to operate.  Informal methods are adequate as 
long as enterprises are small enough for a single person to gather and process 
all or almost all the needed information. But when the industrial revolution 
gave rise to larger productive units, some way had to be found to communicate 
information about activities in one part of the business to decision-makers in 
another. 
There are many different ways to organize these information flows. Choices 
need to be made of  which variables to observe, how often to observe them, 
and how to combine them into summary measures. The route that information 
takes within the business enterprise needs to be specified, whether horizon- 
tally or vertically, generally available or privately held. And the reverse flow 
of information-feedback-can  emphasize or exclude any or all of the infor- 
mation gathered or forwarded. 
It  should be  obvious that the nature of  the information system within a 
company can affect its operation. As Daniel M. G.  Raff and Peter Temin ex- 
plain (chap. 1 in this volume), information is the key to action. One need only 
think about how a business would fare if it had no information at all about its 
internal operation-that  is, if it had an information system that did not collect 
or communicate data about operations. This business would not fare well ex- 
cept by chance. 
It is also true, although not so obvious, that businesses do not always have 
the best information system they could. Competitive pressures are not strong 
enough to ensure that only the fittest survive. It is possible for businesses with 
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inappropriate information systems to survive and even prosper for years. If 
information systems have some uniformity in a country, competition within 
that country may  not press any single business enterprise to change. Only 
when international trade brings this information system-and  other character- 
istics of production-into  competition with others, will Darwinian selection 
ensue. 
This paper demonstrates these propositions by  a historical account of  the 
most pervasive information system in business: accounting. It describes how 
accounting systems in the United States have changed over the past two cen- 
turies and  how these changes have affected the operations of  businesses. It 
argues that current American management accounting is a poor guide for busi- 
ness decisions, that accounting has lost its relevance for the control of busi- 
ness operations. Only with the opening up of the international economy in the 
past two decades has this become apparent, as American businesses and their 
management accounting practices have had to compete with other businesses 
guided by different information. 
2.1  Introduction: What Accounting Does 
For nearly two centuries, businesses have used accounting and nonaccount- 
ing information to direct management decisions at the three levels articulated 
by  RaE  and  Temin:  to direct the work of  individuals, to direct subordinate 
production units, and to plan the extent and financing of  the enterprise as a 
whole.  Until about forty years ago businesses generally used financial ac- 
counting information to plan the extent and financing of the firm as a whole. 
They used nonaccounring information, both financial and nonfinancial, to di- 
rect the work of individuals and production units. In the 1950s, however, busi- 
nesses began to use financial accounting information to direct management 
decisions at all three levels: to control workers and subunits in addition to 
planning the extent and financing of the enterprise as a whole. Using financial 
accounting information to control people as well as to plan financial conse- 
quences is what present-day accountants refer to as management accounting 
(Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 140-42). 
Present-day accountants consider it natural and inevitable that a company’s 
financial accounting system should be its primary source of management in- 
formation. They assume that businesses first created accounting systems to 
collect and report information on financial transactions, and that businesses 
began to use that accounting information to manage internal activities when 
those activities reached a requisite level of complexity, which in most cases 
occurred, apparently, after World War 11. 
However, recent historical research casts doubt on the idea that financial 
accounting systems provided the first source of  sophisticated financial man- 
agement information. Businesses, especially in manufacturing, created very 
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tween the early 1800s and the 1920s (Johnson 1987). The financial manage- 
ment information referred to here was not necessarily derived from account- 
ing records-even  though  it sometimes was reconciled with  account data. 
Rather, it consisted of  cost and margin information derived primarily from 
data about  work processes and other activities,  and  it  was  used  to control 
workers and to evaluate the performance of companies’ subunits. 
Historians now  believe that following World  War  I1 financial accounting 
information intruded upon and distorted the financial and other information 
companies had used for decades to manage not only operating activities at the 
worker and the business unit levels but also strategic product choices at the 
enterprise level. Contrary to popular opinion, new management accounting 
developments after World War  I1  do not indicate financial accounting’s in- 
creased relevance to decision making inside complex organizations; instead, 
they reflect a fall of  management accounting from relevance (Johnson and 
Kaplan  1987). Indeed, many authorities now believe that using financial ac- 
counting information to plan  and control business activities contributed to 
declining competitiveness and profitability in many American manufacturing 
companies after 1960 (Hayes and Abernathy 1980). 
Financial management information arose before World War I primarily to 
simulate market  prices  that  disappeared when  companies internalized and 
managed transactions at the first two levels-workers  and business units. For 
example, reports showing the cost to convert raw materials into finished prod- 
ucts arose as soon as businesses began to manage the work of individuals who 
previously supplied output at spot prices in the market. Later, systems to fore- 
cast cash flows, to budget financial results, and to track gross margins, inven- 
tory turnover, and return on investment, appeared when companies began to 
manage “vertical” transactions between diverse production units that previ- 
ously exchanged through the market (or not at all). 
Before 1920 most businesses-especially  manufacturers-felt  no pressure 
to provide elaborate information for managing financing decisions at the level 
of the company as a whole. The people who financed the company tended to 
be the same people who managed the company-owner-managers  epitomized 
by business leaders such as Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Augustus 
Swift, Pierre du  Pont, and Cyrus McCormick. These people and their close 
associates understood a business and its customers. These owner-individuals, 
perhaps because they were so close to their businesses, seemed to operate as 
though desired financial results emanated from driving workers and business 
units to “do the right thing,” not from driving them to do things that would 
achieve desired overall financial targets. While they all kept books from which 
to periodically compile information about their companies’ overall financial 
results, they kept such information close to their vests. The cost and margin 
information they used to manage decisions at the worker and the business unit 
levels was not defined by,  nor was it necessarily a by-product of, accounting 
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This  gradually  changed, however,  as companies became  more  and more 
concerned with the need to communicate with external financial backers after 
World War  I. External financial reporting became an issue when companies 
turned to capital markets for financing. Few American businesses, other than 
railroads, entered capital markets before the early 1900s. But manufacturers 
turned to capital markets in droves after 1900. To help those companies raise 
capital at the lowest possible cost, investment bankers urged their clients to 
give the public annual audited financial statements.  The need to design and 
audit the contents of such statements sustained decades of  explosive growth 
in accounting practice,  writing, and education. 
The financial cost  accounting  systems  accountants  designed  in the early 
1900s to help manufacturers compile information for external financial report- 
ing would eventually intrude upon and distort the financial information com- 
panies used to manage decisions at the worker and business unit levels. Before 
the era of financial reporting, internal financial information used to organize 
the work of individuals and to organize production units does not seem to have 
impaired manufacturers’  abilities to identify and pursue sources of competi- 
tiveness and profitability. By the 1950s, however, the primary source of infor- 
mation  to organize the work of individuals and to organize production units 
was the financial accounting system designed to supply information about re- 
sults to external backers. Managing costs at the worker and the business unit 
level with  accounting  information  designed for reporting financial results at 
the company level-in  other words, managing by remote control-undoubt- 
edly contributed to many manufacturers’ declining competitiveness and prof- 
itability in the past thirty years. 
The research  discussed  in  this paper draws a critical distinction between 
financial accounting information used to report the global financial results of 
business activities and management information that influences local actions. 
These local actions will eventually affect global results, but the connections 
between them often are not direct. Nevertheless, accounting systems that were 
designed primarily to report financial results to outsiders provided most of the 
financial management information companies used after the 1950s. That was 
not always the  case, however,  and understanding  the difference in financial 
management  information before and after the era of financial reporting adds 
an important dimension to understanding the recent history of  American busi- 
ness. 
This paper explores and describes how businesses for nearly two centuries 
have used financial information to guide the “visible hand” of management. 
The discussion that follows is divided into four parts: the first part describes 
financial  management  information  in  American  companies  before  financial 
reporting became important, during the century or so ending in the 1920s; the 
second part compares pre-financial-reporting cost information with the finan- 
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main source of  management accounting information after World War  11;  the 
third part describes how companies have used this financial cost accounting 
information to manage costs since the 1950s; finally, the fourth part examines 
reasons for and consequences of business migrating from pre-1920s manage- 
ment information practice to the post- 1950s practice of  using financial ac- 
counting numbers to manage by remote control. 
2.2  Financial Management Information in the Era 
before Financial Reporting 
In  the  era before  financial  reporting,  until  World  War  I, top  managers 
seemed comfortable with having accounting information to portray overall 
financial results and with not  also using  that  same information to manage 
the operating activities that  produce those results.  Managers in  charge of 
nineteenth- and early-20th-century companies seemed to understand the dif- 
ference between viewing financial results reported in accounting records and 
managing the underlying activities that cause cost, profit, or return on invest- 
ment (ROI). Top  managers in  nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century busi- 
nesses compiled financial information, especially cost information, to make 
sense of their efforts to manage resources. Although organizations had carried 
out trading activities for centuries, the idea of internalizing market activity 
and managing it inside a company was new in the late eighteenth century. But 
the concept evolved rapidly, from simply manufacturing establishments that 
supplied small, local markets in northern Europe and North America around 
1800 to complex multi-industry enterprises that served world markets by the 
early 1920s (Chandler 1977). 
Accompanying that evolution of managed business enterprise was the de- 
velopment of  virtually all the  financial management  tools used  in  modem 
times-cost  records for labor, material, and overhead; budgets for cash, in- 
come, and capital; flexible budgets, sales forecasts, standard costs, variance 
analysis, transfer prices, and divisional performance measures (Johnson and 
Kaplan 1987). Companies created and modified these tools as needs arose for 
information to plan and control their actions. 
Financial management accounting tools developed from 1800 to the early 
1920s largely in response to one force-the  transfer of  economic exchange 
from market settings into managed business settings. Before the early 1800s, 
market prices in “arm’s length’ transactions between individuals guided vir- 
tually  all  economic  exchange  outside  the  household.  Then  around  1800 
people began to “internalize” economic activity and manage it in a business. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, companies engaged in mining, 
manufacturing, transportation, and distribution decided to internalize numer- 
ous opportunities for exchange that went begging in the marketplace. Results 
of these decisions included, for example, managing workers’ time to stabilize 46  H. Thomas Johnson 
and increase output of  textiles and metal goods; ownership by  steel-making 
companies of raw material sources; and ownership of distribution channels by 
producers of oil and processed beef. 
As these businesses soon discovered, managing economic activity inside a 
company destroys price signals that people take for granted when they ex- 
change in the marketplace. Without those signals, managers are at a loss to 
evaluate the profit consequences of choices in order to plan. The development 
of  financial management information between the early 1800s and the early 
1920s reflects efforts by companies to simulate market price information and 
to judge whether their economic activity is conducted as profitably as it might 
be  in  another company or in the marketplace. These developments can be 
grouped roughly into two categories: first are the systems for cost information 
to control workers in operating activities; second are systems for information 
to plan and evaluate the profitability of organizational subunits. 
2.2.1 
Some of  the earliest financial management information discovered to date 
in manufacturing enterprises was in textile factories-establishments  where 
people found it more lucrative to conduct simple raw material conversion in a 
managed setting than through continual exchanges in the marketplace. Having 
substituted hired workers for subcontractors to process raw and intermediate 
materials, these enterprises lacked prices with  which to evaluate compara- 
tively their managed processes. Intermediate goods were not purchased on the 
market. Instead of choosing which type to buy-the  cheapest of a given qual- 
ity-managers  had to decide which processes needed improvement. Lacking 
a clear price signal, they developed systems for compiling information about 
the cost of converting raw materials into finished output. These systems pro- 
duced summary measures such as cost per hour or cost per pound produced 
for each process and for each worker. The chief goals of the systems were to 
identify different costs for the output of  the company’s internally managed 
processes and to provide a benchmark to measure the efficiency of conversion 
processes. 
Examples of these systems come from the records of American textile com- 
panies, many of which copied the Boston Manufacturing Company’s innova- 
tive management methods. One such company was Lyman Mills Corporation, 
an  integrated water-powered  cotton  textile  establishment built  during  the 
1840s in Holyoke, Massachusetts. From its inception, Lyman Mills used cost 
information to manage the processes by which they converted raw cotton into 
yam and finished fabric (Johnson and Kaplan  1987, 30-31).  Lyman Mills 
drew information from manufacturing cost statements to evaluate and control 
the one aspect of their operation not governed by market exchange prices, the 
conversion of raw materials into finished goods. The company did not need 
information systems to derive the market prices beyond their control, such as 
prices for finished goods, raw cotton, supplies, and workers’ time. They used 
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cost information to evaluate and control their main managed activity-work- 
ers converting raw cotton into yam and fabric. Such information included the 
labor and material cost per pound of output by department (i.e., picking, card- 
ing spinning, weaving) for each worker. 
Information from the Lyman Mills cost statements also offered incentives 
and controls to mitigate slack behavior that might otherwise dissipate the pro- 
ductivity gains inherent in mechanized, multiprocess systems. Workers had a 
natural inclination to use their time efficiently when paid in the market for 
each unit of output they produced; they had no automatic incentive to pursue 
the same goal when paid a fixed wage per period. Periodically, Lyman Mills 
managers used  cost  information  to  monitor  employee performance.  They 
compared productivity among workers in the same process at the same time. 
In addition, they compared productivity for one or more workers over several 
periods of  time. This comparative information helped managers evaluate in- 
ternal  processes  and  encourage  workers to  achieve  company productivity 
goals. 
The transportation industry provides other examples of  nineteenth-century 
companies that developed financial management information to evaluate their 
internal activities. Railroads such as the Pennsylvania and the Erie invented 
systems to compile costs per ton-mile, operating margins, and other statistics 
to evaluate the efficacy of their far-flung and diverse operations. The railroads, 
like manufacturers, devised cost reporting systems to evaluate and control the 
internal processes by  which they converted intermediate inputs into transpor- 
tations services. Using the ton-mile as a basic unit of  output, they created 
complex procedures to calculate the cost per ton-mile. 
Perhaps the first railroad manager to use cost per ton-mile information was 
Albert Fink, general superintendent and senior vice-president of  the Louis- 
ville & Nashville in the late 1860s (Johnson and Kaplan 1987, 36-37;  Chan- 
dler  1977, 116-20).  Fink constructed sixty-eight sets of  accounts grouped 
into four categories according to the different ways that costs varied with out- 
put. One category included maintenance and overhead costs that did not vary 
with  the volume of  traffic; another category included station personnel ex- 
penses that varied with the volume of freight, but not with the number of miles 
run; a third included fuel and other operating expenses that varied with the 
number of train-miles run; the fourth included fixed charges for interest. In 
the first three categories, Fink kept track of the operating expenses on a train- 
mile basis for each subunit of  the railroad. With formulas he worked out to 
convert costs in each category to a ton-mile basis, Fink not only could monitor 
costs per ton-mile for the entire road and each of its subunits, but he also could 
pinpoint reasons for cost differences among the subunits. 
The great complexity and geographic scale of a railroad suggest why man- 
agers such as Fink felt compelled to develop more elaborate cost reports than 
one finds in manufacturing concerns before the 1800s. The railroads did not 
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processes in one physical location, as was the case with early textile factories. 
In railroads, the division of specialized tasks was carried out on such a vast 
and complex scale that there also had to be division of  management tasks as 
well. American railroads were the first businesses in the world in which there 
was a hierarchy of managers who managed other salaried managers. Cost in- 
formation in the railroads became, then, more than just a tool for evaluating 
internal conversion processes; in  the hands of  Fink and those who followed 
him, it also became a tool for assessing the performance of subordinate man- 
agers. 
Still other examples of nineteenth-century businesses that developed cost- 
reporting systems to control internal processes come from the distribution in- 
dustry (Johnson and Kaplan  1987, 41). Like the cost management systems 
devised by  manufacturers and railroads, the distributors’ systems simulated 
market prices with which to evaluate the efficiency of internally managed pro- 
cesses-in  this case, processes for reselling purchased goods. Giant urban 
and regional retailers such as Marshall Field’s and Sears compiled gross mar- 
gin and turnover statistics to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
purchasing, pricing, and selling activities. 
Field’s,  for example,  collected departmental information on  both  gross 
margins and inventory turnover. The information on gross margins (sales re- 
ceipts minus cost of  goods sold and departmental operating expenses) was 
analogous to  the  information  railroads used  to  calculate operating ratios. 
Gross margin information measured each department’s performance and pro- 
vided a means of comparing departments with each other and with the com- 
pany’s overall performance. The information on turnover, however, was prob- 
ably unique to mass distributors. Inventory turnover (cost of sales divided by 
inventory) was for the mass distributor a crucial determinant of  profitability. 
Unlike the traditional merchant, who considered markup on cost as the deter- 
minant of profit margins, the new mass distributors were driven to make profit 
on volume. Hence, they placed enormous importance on the rates at which 
departments turned over their stock each period. 
2.2.2  Planning and Evaluating the Profitability of Organizational Subunits 
These nineteenth-century financial management developments were largely 
independent of  companies’ financial accounting systems. Almost all compa- 
nies kept a transaction-based bookkeeping system that recorded receipts and 
expenditures, and they often produced periodic financial statements for own- 
ers and creditors-usually  distributed privately, but sometimes publicly. Be- 
fore the 1920s, however, no rules or laws shaped the contents of those state- 
ments.  Management information systems and financial accounting systems 
could  operate  independently of  each other, or they  could  be  one and  the 
same-a  company was free to decide for itself. 
Top managers in most companies before World War I1 would have blanched 
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(Johnson and Kaplan 1987, chaps. 2 and 4-6). They often used it to plan and 
evaluate results. But financial plans and budgets were secret documents that 
top management usually kept under lock and key.  Their contents were not 
used to control the actions of subordinates. Managers below the top level were 
not made to think about conducting operations with an eye to overall profit- 
ability. At most, plant and departmental managers were apprised of direct op- 
erating costs and were pressed to keep them under control. But it went without 
saying that those cost-control efforts would not be at the expense of customer 
satisfaction, employee morale, or product quality. 
Indeed, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century top managers usually were 
intimately familiar with their companies’ customers and technologies. They 
did not have to hide behind a facade of  accounting information to converse 
with  subordinates. They could use financial accounting information to plan 
and make decisions and at the same time use nonaccounting information to 
control operations. 
A case in point is Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie was obsessed with produc- 
tion costs and output. He drove his plant superintendents to continuously im- 
prove their costs and their output (Wall  1970, 337). But he did not drive for 
high output in order to achieve low costs. He knew that low costs and high 
output were no guarantee of  profits without satisfied customers. “Carnegie 
insisted . . . that he be provided with a quality product to sell, for he knew 
that one adverse comment on his rails circulated by word of mouth among the 
railroad offices could offset a dozen testimonials in writing that he might dis- 
tribute throughout the country” (ibid., 350). There was little chance that plant 
managers would achieve cost savings by cutting comers that might risk qual- 
ity.  Moreover, Carnegie could inform his plant people about customers’ ex- 
pectations because he  knew  his customers very, very  well and understood 
what they expected. “There was not a railroad president or purchasing agent 
in the entire country with whom he was not personally acquainted and few 
with whom he had not had business in some capacity or other” (ibid., 348). 
And he also knew the steel- and iron-making processes so well that he could 
evaluate his plant managers’ cost-cutting efforts and, in turn, keep them ap- 
prised of  new developments in the world. “The daily communiques [to his 
partners and superintendents], dealing with every detail of the manufacturing 
process from the amount of limestone to be used in the blast furnace charge to 
the relative merits of hammered versus rolled blooms for rails, left no doubt 
in their minds that Carnegie knew his product probably better than most of the 
workmen” (ibid., 352). In short, a keen concern for his company’s financial 
condition never led Carnegie to manage operations by remote control, by driv- 
ing subordinate managers to achieve financial targets at any cost. 
The same spirit was voiced many years later by Alfred Sloan, chairman of 
General Motors from the 1920s to the 1950s, when he said, “The chairman’s 
job is to control the purse strings, not guide the hands of the artisans” (Lee 
1988, 90). Sloan, like Carnegie, obviously appreciated the value to top man- 50  H. Thomas Johnson 
agers of having a broad financial view of a company’s affairs. Like most of his 
contemporaries before World War 11,  however, Sloan also seemed reluctant to 
focus the attention of operating managers on the same financial targets. 
Three sets of cases, drawn from opposite ends of the time spectrum from 
the early 1800s to the early 1900s, indicate how companies in the era before 
financial reporting used financial accounting results to provide a window for 
top management, but different information to provide marching orders for op- 
erating personnel.  The earliest example comes from the  records of  Lyman 
Mills, the Massachusetts  cotton textile manufacturer discussed above (John- 
son and Kaplan 1987, chap. 2). The company’s top managers, located in the 
Boston home office, prepared fully articulated income statements for each of 
the mills located in Holyoke.  However, top management does not appear to 
have  shared the information  in those  statements  with  the mill  managers  in 
Holyoke. Only the treasurer and his peers in Boston saw the mill revenue and 
net  income  figures.  Correspondence  between  the  home  office and the  mill 
manager suggests that top managers focused the mill managers’ attention on 
local mill operating costs, meeting customer delivery schedules, the condition 
of  cotton inventories, mill safety and housekeeping, the condition of workers, 
and mill productivity measured in terms such as output per worker and labor 
cost per pound (or yard). It seems the mills were not viewed as profit centers, 
nor even as cost centers. 
As we noted previously, the cost information reported to mill managers at 
Lyman Mills focused almost entirely on the mill’s consumption of cotton and 
labor time.  The mill cost reports  paid  no attention to so-called fixed costs. 
Consequently,  the mill manager had no incentive to produce output for out- 
put’s sake, simply to minimize  total  costs per unit. He had  no incentive to 
influence reported costs by building inventory. His main concern was to run 
the mill efficiently, not to use its capacity fully. Top management  in Boston 
seems to have  assumed  responsibility  for the  impact of  excess capacity  on 
profitability. 
Over  seventy  years  later,  around  1910, one finds  similar differences  be- 
tween the financial information viewed by top management and the operating 
information used by  subordinate managers in the company that virtually in- 
vented  modem management-E.  I. du Pont de Nemours  Powder Company 
(Johnson and Kaplan  1987, chap. 4). A notable feature of the Du Pont man- 
agement information  system was the  way  it used  and transformed  the  cost 
information devised earlier in  the nineteenth century by companies engaged 
in single functions. Thus, Du  Pont’s manufacturing  units compiled  regular 
information with which to evaluate the costs of converting raw materials into 
gunpowder and dynamite. And its marketing units compiled information on 
gross margins and inventory turnover.  But having integrated these functions 
into one company,  Du Pont pushed further and developed a unique formula 
that combined margin and turnover information into a global analysis of ROI. 
In effect, the information in Du Pont’s ROI system simulated market prices 51  Managing by Remote Control 
for capital in a complex company that had internalized the market for capital. 
To simulate market prices with which to evaluate a diverse internal market for 
capital, the Du Pont Powder Company developed systems before World War I 
to plan and monitor ROI in every comer of  its complex business. Vertically 
integrated enterprises  such as the Du  Pont  Powder Company, having con- 
cluded that their top managers could allocate capital among diverse operating 
functions more efficiently than the marketplace, proceeded to design infor- 
mation systems that simulated information provided by the capital market it- 
self. 
However, Du  Pont seems not to have controlled operating managers with 
the financial information from its early ROI planning budgets. In the decade 
before 1920, top managers at Du Pont had detailed monthly statistics on the 
net income and ROI of  every operating unit in the company. But they seem 
never to have imposed net income or ROI targets on managers of their explo- 
sives manufacturing plants. Instead, plant managers followed targets dealing 
with direct operating costs, timeliness of delivery to customers, product qual- 
ity,  plant  safety, customer training (to use a very  dangerous product),  and 
comparative physical (not dollar) consumption of labor, material, and power 
among plants. Secure in their knowledge that plant managers would look after 
those key determinants of competitiveness, top managers took responsibility 
for the company’s financial performance. 
Companies by  1925 put  these ROI-based systems for monitoring capital 
allocation decisions to a new use-evaluating  managerial prowess in organi- 
zations that had, in effect, internalized the market for managers. In the early 
1920s the Du Pont ROI system was modified and used to evaluate and control 
a decentralized market for managers at both Du Pont and General Motors. Du 
Pont, for instance, faced the need after World War  I to administer a diverse 
array of new product lines created in large part by the company’s efforts to use 
by-products of  their wartime smokeless gunpowder production. By 1919 the 
company no longer made just explosives. Now  they were on the way to pro- 
ducing paints,  plastics,  synthetic fibers, and  gasoline additives.  However, 
they found it too complicated and chaotic to manage such diverse technologies 
and  product markets inside the explosive company’s old  departmentalized 
functional structure. So they partitioned the organization into multiple multi- 
functional divisions,  each defined by  a distinct product  line or technology 
(Chandler 1966, chap. 2). A similar reorganization, orchestrated largely by 
Du  Pont  executives,  occurred  at General Motors between  1921  and  1923 
(Chandler 1966, chap. 3; Johnson and Kaplan 1987, chap. 5). 
In the new multidivisional arrangement, managers of divisions performed 
the same role as top managers did earlier in the multifunctional vertically in- 
tegrated companies. The difference was that divisional managers did not an- 
swer to the capital market-they  reported to a still higher group of managers 
who answered, ultimately, to the capital market (Chandler and Redlich 1961). 
But top managers began using financial accounting information-especially 52  H. Thomas Johnson 
ROI information-to  monitor the performance of  divisional managers. Here 
is the first time top managers unequivocally used financial accounting infor- 
mation to control the actions of subordinate managers. Managers of very large 
multifunctional enterprises-corporate  divisions-were  now hired, trained, 
and disciplined by other managers-not  by the capital market or its represent- 
atives. To  insure commitment and companywide loyalty among divisional 
managers, top managers also created incentive devices, such as the Managers 
Security Company bonus plan at General Motors that Raff and Temin describe 
in chapter 1. 
2.3  Cost Accounting for Financial Reporting after 1900 
As mentioned above, companies in large numbers began to disclose finan- 
cial information to third parties after  1900, when manufacturers turned  to 
financial markets for capital for the first time. In disclosing financial informa- 
tion,  companies ultimately followed reporting rules  mandated by  account- 
ants-auditors-and  by  public agencies.  In  the  United  States these rules 
evolved in the 1920s and 1930s in somewhat different details among various 
agencies (e.g.,  the Securities Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue 
Service, and numerous regulatory authorities); however, the public account- 
ing profession’s rules for audited public statements provided the framework 
for most financial reporting by World War 11. 
Most public financial reports contain at least two items-a  statement of 
financial condition, popularly known as the balance sheet, and a statement of 
financial results, usually referred to as the income statement. A balance sheet 
lists the stock of  assets and claims on those assets at one moment-usually 
the last day of an accounting period. An  income statement reports the total 
flow of revenues and expenses over a period of time. Net income reported in 
the income statement usually equals the change in balance sheet net worth 
(assets minus claims) from beginning to end of the period. 
Public accountants’ rules for financial reporting affect management cost in- 
formation in two important ways. First, they require costs to be classified in 
the income statement by  functional areas of  the business (e.g., purchasing, 
production,  marketing,  selling,  administration,  and  finance). Those  func- 
tional classifications usually conform to subdivisions in a company’s organi- 
zation chart. They do not reflect underlying categories of work, or activities, 
that cause costs. In other words, these classifications tend to identify costs 
with locations where accounting transactions occur, not with locations where 
activities occur that cause the costs. However, companies tend to sort costs 
used for all purposes according to these ubiquitous financial accounts classi- 
fications. As we shall see later, transaction-based cost information is not as 
relevant and reliable as activity-based cost information for making most man- 
agement decisions. 
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mation results from two rules for preparing balance sheets and income state- 
ments. First, balance sheet assets must be valued at historical cost, not current 
market price (unless market price is lower than cost). Second, production ex- 
penses deducted from revenue in an income statement must relate specifically 
to (i.e., “match”) revenues generated in the period. To  fulfill the historical 
cost rule, accountants derive all cost information for financial reports from 
original transactions recorded in a company’s double-entry accounts. To fulfill 
the matching rule, they attach those original transaction costs to manufactured 
products, using cost accounting systems they designed around 1900. 
Accountants designed product costing systems in the early 1900s to divide 
manufacturers’ production costs between goods sold (an expense deducted on 
the income statement) and goods still on hand (an  asset listed on the balance 
sheet as inventory). If  expense deducted on the income statement includes 
outlays to produce goods sold in prior or later periods-violating  the match- 
ing rule-then  income for the period is misstated. This need to divide produc- 
tion costs between output sold and output still on hand does not arise in ser- 
vice organizations, where output is produced and sold at the same moment, or 
in a manufacturing establishment that never has any inventory of unfinished 
or unsold production at the end of  an accounting period. In those cases all 
production expense incurred during a period is deducted from revenue as a 
cost of  the period-a  simple matter requiring no special accounting system. 
Therefore, accountants did not develop product cost accounting systems for 
industries that  do not  manufacture products,  such as service companies in 
banking, insurance, telecommunications, health care, and so forth. Presum- 
ably they would not have developed product costing systems even for manu- 
facturers, except that a manufacturer’s production in one period almost never 
equals the amount sold in the same accounting period. 
To  value unfinished  and  unsold  inventories of  manufactured products at 
their original (i.e., historical) transaction costs,  accountants after  1900 de- 
vised product costing systems to attach direct and indirect production costs to 
products. Procedures for attaching direct costs are straightforward, since each 
product’s consumption of  direct resources (e.g., raw  materials,  purchased 
components,  and  touch labor) is clearly visible.  Indirect production costs 
(often referred  to  as  production overhead),  where  the consumption of  re- 
sources in production is  not visibly connected with a specific product,  are 
attached to products using various arbitrary-but  relatively inexpensive-al- 
location procedures, the most common procedure being to prorate them over 
the direct labor hours expended on each product. For convenience, businesses 
often use a single plantwide rate for allocating overhead to products, regard- 
less of the diversity of their products and processes. 
It is interesting to observe that manufacturers before the era of  financial 
reporting concerned themselves very  little with the subject of  product cost- 
ing-arguably  the topic that contributes most to managerial accounting’s fall 
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they did not feel compelled to “cost” products for financial reporting pur- 
poses. Indeed, to prepare in-house financial statements they were content to 
value unsold and unfinished inventories at market prices. Nevertheless, they 
did experiment with techniques for estimating product costs-especially  near 
the end of the nineteenth century-for  reasons other than financial reporting. 
The  development of  managerial  costing  systems  passed  through  three 
stages between the early  1800s and the  1950s (Johnson  1987). In  the first 
phase, to about 1885, manufacturers’ systems for monitoring factory conver- 
sion costs were not also used to cost products. From a managerial standpoint 
this is understandable. Although these companies often managed several in- 
ternal conversion processes, they tended to produce fairly homogeneous lines 
of  output that were sold in competitive markets. They did not require product 
cost information to evaluate profitability. To assess the profitability of alterna- 
tive choices facing them,  managers simply needed good information about 
conversion costs in processes, and that is the information their cost manage- 
ment systems were designed to deliver. 
Although not required to report financial information to outsiders in  this 
period, manufacturers often prepared financial statements for internal use. As 
we noted previously, their efforts to prepare these statements did not include 
costing products. Their income statements simply deducted from revenues all 
production costs of  the period,  adjusted by  the change in  market  value of 
unsold and unfinished inventories from the beginning to the end of the period. 
By valuing inventories at market, they had no need for systems to attach costs 
to products. An  obvious and simple solution to valuing inventories and to 
matching costs with revenue, market-price valuation was a casualty to histor- 
ical cost rules that twentieth-century accountants imposed on financial report- 
ing in the name of consistency and objectivity. 
In the second phase, between  1885 and World  War  I, managers in some 
industries showed enormous interest in the issue of product costing. However, 
this interest did not reflect any desire to compile product cost information for 
financial reporting.  Rather, the  interest reflected a need  for information to 
evaluate prices  and  profitabilities of  diverse,  often custom-made products 
made in complex metalworking shops. Facing diverse lines of  products that 
consumed resources at widely varying rates, managers in those firms sought 
accurate product cost and profitability information, primarily to help them bid 
on custom orders. 
A noteworthy aspect of this search for reliable product costs is the careful 
treatment these late-nineteenth-century metalworking firms gave to overhead 
costs. Epitomized by the writings of A. H. Church, a contemporary of Fred- 
erick W.  Taylor,  they advocated meticulously tracing resource costs to the 
products that cause the consumption of resources (Vangermeersch 1986, pas- 
sim). Unlike accountants who were beginning to write about product costing 
for financial reporting at this time, Church and his peers were not content to 
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The accountants and Church, of course, had very different reasons for costing 
products. Accountants merely wanted an easy and low-cost way of attaching 
overhead costs to products in order to match historical costs against revenue. 
Church and other managers of  complex machine shops wanted reliable cost 
information to use in bidding. 
After a few companies failed at trying to implement his costing concepts, 
Church’s proposals for tracing overhead costs to products fell out of favor and 
were relegated to the dustbin of history after World War I. The cost of gather- 
ing and compiling such information made Church’s costing procedures pro- 
hibitive in  the early  1900s. However, historians have noted  how  Church’s 
costing methods resembled activity-based costing techniques made possible 
in the 1980s by the advent of powerful personal computers. 
The third phase in the development of managerial product costing between 
the early  1800s and  1950s began around  1914. At  that time, companies in 
some industries desired product cost information to make decisions, but their 
wishes were thwarted by the high cost of processing information. These com- 
panies, all producing diverse lines of products, faced a dilemma. They knew 
not to use accountants’ financial cost information to evaluate product mix and 
pricing decisions. But the high cost of  processing reliable information pre- 
cluded installing alternative product costing systems, such as the ones advo- 
cated by Church (Yates 1989). Instead, these companies resolved the problem 
with alternatives other than costing systems. 
A solution for some companies, especially hardware-making and metal- 
working companies, was to ignore product cost information and charge ahead 
with  a strategy of  producing and selling “full product lines.” They did not 
question an individual customer’s special product demands as long as total 
profitability of the entire company seemed assured. To know total profitability 
did not require information about costs of  separate products-only  the total 
cost information that was already available at no extra cost in the financial 
accounting system. 
Other companies in the 1920s, especially large firms whose product diver- 
sity cut across technological lines (e.g., Du  Pont) or industry markets (e.g., 
General Motors), solved the problem of high information-processing costs by 
creating decentralized multidivisional organizations. Du  Pont,  as discussed 
above, divisionalized to cope with the complexity brought on by new product 
technologies at the end of World War I; General Motors, as discussed by Raff 
and Temin, divisionalized by  creating a strong corporate staff to coordinate 
and direct a diversity of  product offerings. Both companies coped with the 
complexity of product diversity by placing the activities of each distinct prod- 
uct line into separate compartments that were subject to the financial disci- 
pline of a strong corporate staff. By lowering the cost of coping with diversity, 
divisionalization extended the horizontal boundaries of companies such as Du 
Pont and General Motors. 
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tem, such as A. H. Church’s, that could reliably trace costs to separate prod- 
uct lines. Presumably it was less costly in the 1920s to restructure than it was 
to  implement a  Church-style costing system.  However,  modem  computer 
technology probably makes the information-processing alternative less costly 
than restructuring as a way to manage the complexity of diversity today. The 
unbundling of  many diverse conglomerates in the  1980s suggests that is the 
case. Perhaps multidivisional structures would never have become popular if 
the computer hardware and software technology of  the  1980s-the  where- 
withal to make A. H. Church’s product costing scheme practical-had  been 
available in the early 1900s. 
2.4  Managing with Financial Accounting Information after 1950 
Businesses in the past forty years have used financial accounting informa- 
tion not only to plan the extent and financing of the business as a whole and 
to report results to outsiders, but also to manage operations inside the com- 
pany. Thus, accounting information intended primarily for reporting the finan- 
cial results of  business operations is used to shape decisions and actions that 
determine those results. This use of financial accounting information may not 
be  surprising.  Unlike  management  information,  which  is  subjective  and 
process-oriented, financial accounting is objective and rules-oriented. Indeed, 
financial accounting information provides “an aggregate test of the efficacy of 
the operational control systems in  achieving their objectives,” and financial 
accounting systems “provide the aggregation and summary necessary to re- 
duce complex operations data to comprehensible scores of performance” (Ar- 
mitage and Atkinson 1990, 141). 
However, financial results do not “provide the basis for understanding what 
needs to be changed and how.” They merely “provide a diagnostic of whether 
there has been  a failure in the operations control systems that needs to be 
discovered and corrected” (ibid.). Consequently, the practice in the past forty 
years of using accounting information to manage operating activities is prob- 
lematic. As  many believe, the practice may have impeded competitiveness 
and impaired profitability in recent years. For evidence to support this claim, 
consider two managerial tasks that have been particularly affected by the prac- 
tice of managing activities with remote accounting information: planning and 
decision support, and control of operations. 
2.4.1  Planning and Decision Support 
In running a business, managers need information about the financial con- 
sequences of intended actions. As a guide for planning, and to choose among 
alternatives, managers need  profitability information. They especially need 
reliable cost information. Cost information serves in many planning and de- 
cision support roles, such as estimating profit margins of products and product 
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tal  cost budgets, and charging administrative services to production depart- 
ments. 
An  important source of cost information in  American business since the 
1950s has been the financial cost accounting system. As we mentioned above, 
these costing systems were designed originally to attach production costs to 
manufactured goods in order to divide an accounting period’s total production 
costs between products sold and products still unfinished or unsold at the end 
of the period. They were not intended to provide information about costs of 
individual products. Moreover, companies rarely used them to gauge individ- 
ual products’ costs before World War 11.  But companies everywhere used in- 
formation from the financial cost accounts to evaluate costs of products after 
the 1950s. 
An  example can be  drawn from this history of  a regulated public utility. 
AT&T  was  a regulated monopoly for many years during which accounting 
techniques were designed to measure the overall rate of return of the company 
and, as time went on, to separate revenues and costs into interstate and intra- 
state categories. Competition was allowed into a small comer of AT&T’s busi- 
ness in  1959. AT&T responded by cutting its prices for the affected services, 
and the new entrants complained to the regulators. 
The regulators asked AT&T if  the new prices covered AT&T’s costs. The 
problem was that no one had ever calculated the cost of an individual service 
before. The question had not arisen in the previous eighty years of  AT&T 
history. AT&T had followed the pattern of  selling a full product line, as de- 
scribed above. This large and sprawling business had been managed by a va- 
riety of  specific indicators that did not involve the allocation of overhead to 
specific activities. There consequently were no rules or guidelines with which 
to allocate AT&T’s huge fixed costs to individual services. The quest for a 
solution to  this  problem-still  controversial today-would  consume vast 
amounts of legal and regulatory time of the next twenty years (Temin 1990). 
Financial accounting systems provide poor information to evaluate product 
costs in manufacturing as well as in regulated telecommunication companies 
(Johnson and Kaplan 1987, chap. 8; Cooper and Kaplan 1988). The manufac- 
turing cost accountants’ traditional approach to allocating overhead costs, in 
proportion to direct labor hours, systematically distorts the costs of individual 
products. Attaching overhead costs in  proportion to volume of  output is  a 
convenient and economical way to insure that production costs are properly 
matched against revenues at a macrolevel in financial statements. But at the 
microlevel of the individual product this allocation technique provides reliable 
cost information only if we assume most overhead costs are caused by or vary 
in proportion to units of output (Cooper 1990). 
This assumption is probably never true, and certainly was not in American 
manufacturing companies after the 1950s. Indeed, a steady-some  would say 
explosive-growth  in manufacturing overhead costs after the 1950s accom- 
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direct labor hours. Moreover, products that consume relatively large chunks 
of direct labor-established  lines of commodity-type products that are mass- 
produced with older labor-intensive technologies-did  not cause overhead to 
grow after the  1950s. Causing overhead to grow were less labor-intensive 
products that were custom-made with newer, less familiar, and more expen- 
sive materials and equipment, as well as rapidly proliferating varieties of new 
products that demanded expensive design, scheduling, and rework time-all 
sources of overhead cost. By allocating overhead on direct labor hours, prod- 
ucts that caused indirect costs to increase were systematically undercosted, 
and products not responsible for the increase were systematically overcosted. 
These distortions tend to cancel out at the macro level and therefore do not 
affect income and asset totals reported in financial statements. But they give a 
misleading picture of  individual products’ margins, as many American and 
European manufacturers discovered in the 1970s and 1980s when, using  fi- 
nancial  cost  accounting  information to  measure product costs,  they  erro- 
neously assumed they could improve their company’s profitability by  prolif- 
erating varieties of newer “high-tech” lines. In one well-documented case a 
manufacturer of  automotive components in  the  1970s, Schrader Bellows, 
added a dizzying array of  complex new products that its accounting system 
said were quite profitable. In fact, the strategy depressed earnings and led the 
company to the edge of bankruptcy by the early 1980s (Cooper 1985). 
Recognition of this problem grew during the 1970s, and a solution to the 
problem, known today as activity-based costing (ABC), began to appear in 
the early 1980s (Cooper 1987; Johnson and Kaplan  1987, chap.  10). Advo- 
cates of ABC tell companies, in effect, to cost products differently for finan- 
cial reporting information than for planning and decision-support informa- 
tion. For strategic planning information, ABC costs the activities, or work, 
that cause overhead costs and then assigns overhead costs to products by add- 
ing up costs of activities that each product consumes. Simple in concept, ABC 
was a practical impossibility until the advent of low-cost microchip technolo- 
gies in the 1970s made it economic to collect and compile activity-based cost 
information. 
2.4.2  Control of Operations 
Companies always had used accounting information to view results of  op- 
erations, but accounting targets generally were not considered a tool for con- 
trolling operations until after World War  11.  By  the  1950s, companies began 
to evaluate and motivate the performance of  operating personnel at all levels 
in terms of accounting results such as costs, net income, or ROI. 
An  analogy that  helps clarify the difference between  using  financial ac- 
counting information to “see” results and to “manage” results is the giant elec- 
tronic display board controllers use to monitor activities in a modern oil refin- 
ery, chemical plant, or power-generating station. If they followed the logic 
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tions or oil refineries would tell personnel in each department to come in from 
the plant and run things “by  the lights” on their respective sections of  the 
control board. Following those instructions, which people are likely to do if 
an incentive scheme links their compensation to the performance of lights on 
the board, people will forget what they must do to fulfill the plant’s original 
purpose. Instead, they will take to conducting operations in the plant with an 
eye to manipulating their department’s lights on the board. While that does 
not portray how electronic control boards are used in processing plants, the 
following two examples suggest it may accurately depict how companies used 
accounting information to control operating performance after the 1950s. 
The first example shows how cost accounting information often confounds 
efforts to manage costs simply because it shows only where money was spent, 
and how much, not why it was spent. A hypothetical company’s production 
department in  Cleveland records costs in  two  separate lines for resin  and 
maintenance incurred in running extrusion machinery. These cost accounts do 
not indicate, however, that resin and maintenance consumed in the production 
department reflect a policy, carried out by  the company’s purchasing depart- 
ment in Baltimore, to “buy in large quantities from vendors that quote the 
lowest price.” A dumpster full of defective extrusions and extra maintenance 
to unclog gummed-up extrusion machines simply show up in the accounts as 
extra costs of production in Cleveland, not as the price paid for a Baltimore 
purchasing agent’s efforts to win a bonus by  acquiring raw material at the 
lowest cost. Attempts to manage the costs recorded in such accounts will not 
affect  purchasing policies executed in Baltimore. Instead, favorable price var- 
iances on raw material purchases will encourage more of the same policies, 
while unfavorable production cost variances will focus attention on “ineffi- 
ciencies” in Cleveland, perhaps prompting a decision to reduce costs by  out- 
sourcing extrusion to a Third World country. 
The second example showing how “managing by  remote control” caused 
harm after the 1950s involves the use of  standard cost targets to control the 
performance of operating personnel (Hall, Johnson, and Tumey 1990, chap. 
3). Almost all American manufacturing companies for the past forty years 
have used cost targets from top-level planning budgets to set standards for 
operating personnel. These cost targets are seen as an important tool to control 
the operating performance of  plant  managers and department supervisors. 
Like the setting for desired room temperature on a thermostat, cost targets are 
a setting to compare against actual costs. Variances between actual and de- 
sired costs provide “feedback” that is supposed to prompt operating personnel 
to adjust what they are doing, as a furnace adjusts in response to feedback 
from the thermostat. 
Standard cost variance systems monitor costs in each and every process of 
a company’s production system. For direct costs, labor and machine tracking 
schemes report direct costs per hour or per unit of output. For overhead costs, 
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units produced. The goals of these reporting schemes is to have all recorded 
direct labor or machine hours go toward production of  standard output and 
thereby “absorb” or “cover” direct and overhead costs-a  condition referred 
to as “efficient  .” 
Department managers beat  this  system by  scheduling workers and  ma- 
chines to produce output in long runs, so less time is charged to categories of 
indirect or “nonchargeable” time such as changeovers or setups. Because out- 
put enables a department to “earn” the direct hours incurred each reporting 
period, supervisors keep workers and machines busy producing output. Every 
unit produced-including  the equivalent of  full units  in  partially  finished 
work-entitles  the department to a standard allotment of machine or person 
hours. If  a department produces enough equivalent finished output to “earn” 
all the direct hours reported in the period, it is declared “100 percent efficient.” 
It does not matter if the output is saleable. In fact, hours spent on “allowable” 
rework are often considered to be “efficiently covered.” With so flawed a sys- 
tem, people sometimes put in hours creating defects, just to build inventory 
and to create more rework. 
Ironically, managers’ efforts to achieve high standard cost efficiency ratings 
have tended over time to increase a company’s total costs and to impair com- 
petitiveness (Johnson 1990; Kaplan  1985). Achieving standard direct cost ef- 
ficiency targets leads to larger batches, longer production runs, more scrap, 
and rework-especially  if  incentive compensation is geared to controlling 
standard-to-actual variances. Pressure to minimize standard cost variances, by 
encouraging department supervisors to keep machines and people busy pro- 
ducing output, regardless of market demand, often causes unnecessary inven- 
tones  of  finished and  in-process merchandise to accumulate,  product lead 
times to increase, and dependability at keeping schedules to decrease. Stan- 
dard cost systems reward personnel for meeting independent finance-driven 
targets, not for satisfying customers, internal and external. Indeed, customers 
scarcely fit into the world  of  standard cost performance. The customer is 
merely  someone the  company  persuades to  buy  the  output  managers are 
driven to produce, at prices it is hoped exceed variable costs. 
Managing  costs  with  accounting  information  in  standard  cost  systems 
impedes companies’ competitiveness and long-term profitability primarily be- 
cause it motivates people to sustain output in order to achieve cost targets. It 
encourages managers to achieve financial cost targets by producing output for 
its own sake, instead of encouraging them to focus on the one key to compet- 
itive operations and long-term profitability-namely,  empowering people to 
efficiently satisfy customer wants. 
This impetus to produce output for its own sake, rather than to concentrate 
on the work needed to satisfy customers, also results from using net  income 
or ROI targets to control operations-another  example of  managing by  re- 
mote control that appeared in the  1950s. Moreover, managing profit or ROI 
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output for its own sake because of the “matching” rules that require account- 
ants to attach production overhead costs to manufactured goods. Only over- 
head costs attached to products sold are deducted against revenue in the in- 
come statement. Therefore, the more units of output produced in a period and 
the more of those units that remain unsold (but marketable) at the end of  a 
period, the less overhead cost is deducted from revenue in the period. Smart 
managers who need to temporarily boost income know what to do: go into 
overtime, rent temporary warehouse space, and get busy producing output. 
Obviously this practice has a backlash. In the next period, unless selling 
prices rise, income is reduced by prior period’s costs carried forward in inven- 
tory  sold in the next period.  But managers usually  assume they  can build 
inventory to boost income in one period and then spread the effect of the back- 
lash over several future periods, meanwhile hoping no one notices the added 
inventory carried over from the first period. 
Actions taken by operations managers who are driven by remote financial 
controls will impair companywide competitiveness and long-term profitability 
not just because accounting rules drive them to produce output for its own 
sake. Other steps they take to manipulate financial performance that impair a 
company’s  long-term  economic  health  include deferring  discretionary ex- 
penditures for research and development, postponing maintenance programs, 
encouraging employee turnover as a way of holding down direct labor costs, 
cutting back employee benefit programs, purchasing materials and supplies 
only from vendors who bid the lowest prices, cutting employee training pro- 
grams, postponing capital investments in expensive new  technologies (i.e., 
scrape by as long as possible on old, fully depreciated assets), and more. 
The practices spawned by  using accounting numbers to manage business 
operations culminated by the 1970s in people viewing a company as a “port- 
folio” of income-producing assets. Strategists who adopted that view saw top 
managements’ job as maximizing the value of a company by properly balanc- 
ing the risks and returns of a company’s asset portfolio. While appropriate for 
managing portfolios of  marketable securities, such strategies are totally mis- 
applied when used to manage a business. Managers of  conglomerates who 
followed such strategies turned their attention completely away from internal 
operating activities and customer satisfaction and attempted to create value 
out  of  thin  air by  “acquiring  stars,” “milking cash cows,”  and  “divesting 
dogs .” 
The consequences of  managing operations with  financial targets are re- 
vealed in the recently published history of  a company swallowed up in the 
conglomeration boom of the 1970s. The company, Burgmaster, was the larg- 
est American machine-tool maker west of Chicago when it was bought out by 
a conglomerate in the mid-1960s. Fifteen years later the conglomerate became 
the nation’s first large leveraged buyout. Burgmaster’s history falls into two 
phases: twenty years of  excellent growth and profitability in the hands of  a 
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twenty  years  of  decline  into  bankruptcy  in  the  hands  of  finance-driven, 
numbers-oriented professional managers. Burgmaster’s demise, mirrored by 
countless other companies whose stones have yet to be documented, can be 
attributed in no small way  to the disinterest in  people and customers asso- 
ciated with an obsessive push to manage operations with accounting numbers 
by remote control (Holland 1989). 
2.5  Management Accounting’s Lost Relevance after 1950: 
Reasons and Consequences 
Underlying modem management accounting-and  the cause of its lost rel- 
evance-is  the belief businesses can both plan and control their affairs with 
financial accounting information (Johnson 1988). This belief was not wide- 
spread  before  the  1950s.  Indeed,  before  World  War  I1  companies rarely 
viewed financial accounting information as anything other than a compilation 
of results (after-the-event information) or as data that could be used to project, 
or simulate, the financial consequences of  proposals and plans (before-the- 
event information). Financial accounting information was almost never used 
to set targets for operating performance. 
Businesses have suffered because managers began to take accounting num- 
bers seriously as an object to manage rather than considering them as passive 
measures of results. By  the 1960s, for example, top managers had begun to 
impose ROI and net income targets on subordinates other than just divisional 
mangers. They were not content simply to budget and plan based on these 
financial targets. Instead, financial planning targets were used to control the 
actions of  subordinate managers and operating personnel. Companies drove 
the profit center concept of responsibility lower and lower into organizations 
and thereby made it necessary to evaluate growing numbers of  people with 
short-term financial measures like ROI. “Tight financial controls with a short- 
term emphasis” inevitably impair long-term profitability because they  will 
“bias choices toward the less innovative, less technologically aggressive alter- 
natives” (Hayes and Abemathy 1980, 70, 77). 
Top managers after the 1950s took a fateful leap that their nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century predecessors had resisted. They began to use account- 
ing information for a purpose it was not intended to serve. They began using 
accounting information “to guide the artisans’ hands.” That practice, more 
than  any  other, defines management accounting’s lost  relevance  in  recent 
years. In effect, the decline into irrelevance of management accounting was a 
case of putting the cart before the horse. Financial information about business 
results-the  cart-became  the prime object of managers’ attention. Manag- 
ers quickly lost sight of the horse, that is, the underlying forces that produce 
financial results. The rest, as they say, is history. Financially oriented manag- 
ers were poorly equipped to lead companies through the competitive wars of 
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What caused the change that we notice by the 1960s? Usually people blame 
either the accounting profession, for reporting rules that cause perverse con- 
sequences, or Wall  Street, for pressuring top managers to achieve market- 
pleasing quarterly financial results. However, financial reporting information 
and Wall Street pressures may simply shoulder blame for a much deeper prob- 
lem; namely, the gradual but relentless power of  accounting systems to con- 
quer and shape managers’ attitudes. As I said before, accounting is more than 
just a neutral, technical tool that measures financial outcomes. It also influ- 
ences the decisions that determine outcomes. Indeed, the history of manage- 
ment accounting in the last fifty years is the story of accounting systems tak- 
ing on a life of their own and shaping the way managers run businesses. 
By  the 1960s, the intrusion of  financial accounting into management ac- 
counting systems was  causing top managers’ to abdicate their strategic re- 
sponsibilities. Instead of being broad-gauged integrators-conversant  in pro- 
duction, marketing, and finance-many  American senior executives by  1970 
were forced excessively on the financial dimension of  business.  They had 
adopted a “newly managerial gospel” that encourages “a preference for (1) 
analytic detachment rather than the insight that comes from ‘hands on’ expe- 
rience and (2) short-term cost reduction rather than long-term development of 
technological competitiveness” (Hayes and Abernathy 1980, 68). 
In trying to explain how the top managers in American industry migrated 
during the past century from the likes of Andrew Camegie to the type of in- 
dividual just described, one must place a great deal of emphasis on the grow- 
ing influence accounting information has had on managers since World War 
11. The proximate origins of this influence probably lie in the increased use of 
ROI information that accompanied the spread of the multidivisional form of 
business after the 1920s. In multidivisional companies, the “increased struc- 
tural distance between those entrusted with exploiting actual competitive op- 
portunities and those who must judge the quality of their work virtually guar- 
antees reliance on objectively quantifiable short-term criteria” (ibid., 70). 
These diversified organizations were, as suggested earlier, “nurseries” for top- 
level corporate managers-graduate  training grounds, as it were, before there 
were many graduate business schools. Having been schooled in the virtues of 
managing through accounting systems, division managers took the same les- 
son with them when they rose to the top. Eventually, financial reporting dom- 
inates managers’ attention to the point where they no longer know,  or care, 
about the production, technological, and marketing determinants of competi- 
tiveness. 
The multidivisional organization is not, of course, the only influence that 
reinforced and justified the practice of remote management through account- 
ing  systems.  Another  influence  was  business  education itself.  Following 
World  War  I1 American business schools adopted the economist’s model of 
the firm as the paradigm for teaching business decision making. Writers of 
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accounting  information could  be  made “managerially  relevant ,”  largely  by 
separating fixed from variable costs. This model was appropriate for studying 
price behavior in market settings, but it was not relevant to understanding the 
workings of a managed enterprise. Nevertheless, thousands of  managers by 
the 1960s were trained to work with a version of economics that does not deal 
with activities inside managed firms. 
Teaching this economic theory to business students and using it to rational- 
ize management by remote accounting controls tended to reinforce in manag- 
ers’ minds the virtues of  the mass-productiodmass-market  mindset that had 
shaped the way companies organized their operations since early in the cen- 
tury. A mass-productiodmass-market mindset that took root in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century was nourished and promoted after World War I1 by 
the new management accounting practices. 
This mindset tends to be linked to a vertical-hierarchical approach to man- 
aging that focuses on the performance of  individuals, not groups. It also is 
associated with the poor competitive performance and falling profitability of 
American manufacturers in the last twenty years (Aoki 1990). The approach 
is reinforced, but not necessarily caused, by using financial accounting num- 
bers to control operating activities.  An alternative horizontal/team-oriented 
approach (often associated with Japanese companies) is seen as more condu- 
cive to competitiveness and profitability in the global economy. It reaches for 
enhanced flexibility by building  to smaller scale and encouraging people to 
move constraints,  not optimize within them. This approach to management 
overcomes the real short-term bias, which is not simply thinking in terms of 
next period’s income statement, but refusing to move constraints and believ- 
ing that the best results are had by “optimizing” inside existing constraints. 
To get from the vertical to the horizontal approach, companies must change 
the way they do business and change the way they organize operations. The 
lost market share, closed plants, and other ills that we associate with Ameri- 
can manufacturing in the  1970s and 1980s were not caused by poor-quality 
management  accounting numbers as much  as they  were caused by  an  ap- 
proach to management that was reinforced by the habit of  controlling opera- 
tions with accounting numbers. 
2.6  Conclusion 
In short, patterns of  production are shaped by accounting information flows 
in business enterprises. Using financial accounting information to control op- 
erations has encouraged the vertical organization of businesses and mass pro- 
duction. Managing by financial accounting and mass production have become 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. 
This approach was very successful in the years after World War 11. Ameri- 
can  mass  production  dominated  world  production.  But  accounting  infor- 
mation can impede managers’ comprehension of changing competitive con- 65  Managing by Remote Control 
ditions.  American  firms  by  the  1970s  were  saddled  with  a  management 
accounting system that did not help them produce for global markets. 
It sounds paradoxical  to say that managers  choose to look at the wrong 
information. But organizational structures and information systems are fixed 
investments as durable as any building (Yates, chap. 4 in this volume). Man- 
agement accounting systems may outlast their usefulness, and it may be hard 
for practitioners to realize that a massive new investment is needed. The his- 
torical examples in  this paper suggest  that a precondition for an American 
industrial resurgence is a sharp turn away from existing management account- 
ing practices and toward a new model that focuses operating managers' atten- 
tion  on processes  and  people  (especially  customers,  employees,  and  sup- 
pliers), not on financial accounting results. 
References 
Aoki, Masahiko,  1990. Toward an economic model of the Japanese firm.  Journal of 
Economic Literature 28 (March): 1-27. 
Armitage, Howard M., and Anthony A. Atkinson.  1990. The choice ofproductivity 
measures in organizations: A field study of practice in seven Canadian firms. Ham- 
ilton, Ontario: Society of Management Accountants of Canada. 
Chandler,  Alfred  D.,  Jr.  [1962]  1966.  Strategy  and  structure.  Garden  City,  NY: 
Doubleday. 
. 1977. The visible  hand: The managerial  revolution  in American business. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., and Fritz Redlich. 1961. Recent developments in American 
business and their conceptualization. Business History Review 35 (Spring): 1-27. 
Cooper, Robin.  1985. Schrader Bellows. Boston: Harvard Business School Case Ser- 
vices. 
. 1987. The two-stage procedure in cost accounting: Part one. Journal ofcost 
Management (Summer):43-5 1. 
. 1990. Cost classification in unit-based and activity-based manufacturing cost 
systems. Journal of Cost Management (Fall):4-14. 
Cooper, Robin,  and Robert S. Kaplan,  1988. Measure costs right:  Make the right 
decisions. Harvard Business Review (September-October):96-103. 
Hall, Robert W., H. Thomas Johnson, and Peter Tumey. 1990. Measuring up: Chart- 
ing pathways to manufacturing excellence. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin. 
Hayes, Robert H., and William J. Abernathy. 1980. Managing our way to economic 
decline. Harvard Business Review (July-August):67-77. 
Holland, Max.  1989. When the machine stopped: A cautionary talefrom industrial 
America. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Johnson,  H. Thomas.  1987. The decline of  cost management: A reinterpretation of 
20th-century cost accounting history. Journal of  Cost Management (Spring):5-12. 
. 1988. Let's return the controller to relevance: A historical perspective. In Cost 
Accounting of  the '90s:  Responding to Technological Change, 195-202.  Montvale, 
NJ: National Association of Accountants. 
. 1990. Performance measurement for competitive excellence. In Measures for 66  H.  Thomas Johnson 
Manufacturing Excellence, ed., Robert  S. Kaplan, 63-90.  Boston: Harvard Busi- 
ness School Press. 
Johnson, H. Thomas, and Robert S. Kaplan. 1987. Relevance lost: The rise and fall of 
management accounting. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Kaplan, Robert S. 1985. Accounting lag: The obsolescence of  cost accounting sys- 
tems. In The uneasy alliance: Managing the productivity-technology dilemma, ed. 
Kim B. Clark, Robert H. Hayes, and Christopher Lorenz, 195-226.  Boston: Har- 
vard Business School Press. 
Lee, Albert, 1988. Call me Roger. Chicago: Contemporary Books. 
Temin, Peter. 1990. Cross subsidies in the telephone network after divestiture. Journal 
Vangermeersch, Richard, ed. 1986. The contributions of  Alexander Hamilton Church 
Wall, Joseph Frazier. 1970. Andrew Carnegie. New  York: Oxford University Press. 
Yates, JoAnne. 1989. Control through communication: The rise of system in American 
of Regulatory Economics 2:349-62. 
to accounting and management. New York: Garland Publishing. 
management. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Comment  Peter Tufano 
Johnson’s essay “Managing Costs by Remote Control” details how accounting 
information has been used and misused to manage American businesses since 
the early nineteenth century. He chronicles the early search for relevant data 
to measure the performance of people and processes,  and the later adoption of 
flawed financial reporting targets.  Johnson’s work clearly demonstrates how 
information,  incorporated  into  incentive  systems,  can  dramatically  affect 
managerial decisions. 
Accounting systems produce imprecise and sometimes misleading clues to 
performance. Investors have long recognized this fact. In the nineteenth cen- 
tury, major investment guides gave potential railroad bondholders detailed op- 
erating, as well as financial, data with which to judge the performance of the 
roads. In the late twentieth century, financial reporting and disclosure are ex- 
tensive, but much of the well-compensated work of security analysts is to look 
through and beyond financial statements produced  by companies. Thus, the 
financial markets respond to accounting data, but also search for other mea- 
sures of performance, and use judgment in interpreting audited annual reports 
in order to make investment decisions. 
Contrast how  skeptical investors  use accounting  data with  how  modern 
managers use financial information, according to Johnson. Modem managers 
use  roo  little  information,  specially  management  accounting  information 
based upon financial reporting data. These data are technically jawed in that 
they improperly allocate costs. Finally,  modern managers mechanically use 
these bad measures to produce decisions and create incentives. 
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The historical evidence that Johnson cites in sections 2.2 and 2.3 suggests 
that, until World War I, these three problems were avoided. Managers used a 
great deal of information, much of it operating statistics, to control firm activ- 
ities. Thus they did not overlook important nonfinancial variables like product 
quality. The financial information embedded in operating statistics was not 
constrained by  generally accepted accounting principles such as those that 
dictate the use of historical cost as a basis for valuation. The most complicated 
element of  the historical picture that Johnson paints is the apparent tension 
between owners monitoring minute operating details yet providing proper in- 
centives for managers to achieve a wide range of  operating goals. Johnson 
uses the example of Lyman Mills, which apparently developed a useable cost 
information system that was communicated to mill managers. Somehow, the 
home office and top managers “focused” the mill managers’ attention not only 
on costs, but also on schedules, inventory levels, safety and employee condi- 
tions, and mill productivity. 
The example of  Lyman Mills suggests that owners must have given man- 
agers broad marching orders. Without a better appreciation for how early in- 
centive systems worked, it is impossible to ascertain the impact the quality of 
data had upon the decision-making process. For example, Johnson condemns 
modem management accounting for motivating managers to produce excess 
inventories, in part because it measures costs incorrectly and in part because 
incentive compensation is tied to standard-to-actual variances. A mill man- 
ager intent on  meeting all customers’ orders and  on increasing output per 
worker may also be guilty of producing high levels of inventories. 
People facing multiple objectives must make trade-offs among conflicting 
goals. They are guided explicitly by orders from top management, or implic- 
itly through compensation,  hiringhiring,  or  investment decisions made by 
firms. Johnson’s historical evidence tantalizes us by suggesting that managers 
were instructed to address a wide range of  concerns, but stops short of telling 
us how they made decisions. 
Johnson claims that financial accounting information was not used to “con- 
trol” but rather only to “plan and evaluate.” First, the distinction between uses 
of  information is quite vague.  Second, the prima facie evidence supporting 
his claim that financial targets were not used to manage firms is that financial 
results were not communicated to operating managers. However, data that are 
not directly observable can still influence decisions. For example, a child may 
never learn her IQ, but that measure can affect child development profoundly 
if  her parents react to their unrevealed knowledge of  the score. Much more 
concretely, Levenstein’s work on Dow Chemical, presented in chapter 3 in this 
volume,  suggests that operating managers were indeed evaluated based on 
financial performance-and  acted accordingly-even  though they could not 
directly observe the  financial data. This research suggests that  companies 
were indirectly “run by the numbers” well before Johnson suggests our cur- 
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been more relevant. Thus, if  top executives were concerned with financial 
reporting results that measured the changes in  their own  wealth, they may 
have  transmitted this concern to their subordinates even though the specific 
data were not revealed. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 chronicle changes in management accounting prac- 
tice, specifically the development and use of  cost accounting systems. Ac- 
cording to Yates’s work in  chapter 4 in this volume, changes in  the cost of 
collecting information provide a powerful explanation for management ac- 
counting developments. In  the early period, managers measured what was 
cheapest to  measure;  that  is,  the  physical  amount  of  inventories or  the 
throughput of processes. Two trends influenced the cost of information gath- 
ering and spurred the adoption of financial reporting information as the basis 
for  management  accounting. Over  time,  production  technologies became 
more complicated, especially in multiproduct firms with many joint produc- 
tion costs. As a result, direct measurements of  physical processes became 
more expensive and less informative. At the same time, investors, auditors, 
and regulators demanded more standardized financial information. For ex- 
ample, the investment community at the turn of  the century began to focus 
more on a corporation’s earnings than on its assets as a basis for valuation. 
This trend manifested itself in new forms of  securities, such as debentures, 
but in turn required that more information be available so that earnings could 
be measured. These demands for financial information made the marginal cost 
of  using financial reporting data for management accounting nearly zero. In 
other words, financially oriented management accounting was a low-cost by- 
product of the financial reporting system, just as modem activity-based cost- 
ing is a by-product of lowered computing costs. 
In section 2.4, Johnson contends that management accounting systems are 
not neutral measurement tools. When flawed metrics are used to mechanically 
motivate managers, wrong decisions are made. Johnson discusses cases where 
costs are not properly allocated to products or externalities are not identified. 
He cites field evidence and prior research to support the claim that poor man- 
agement accounting information leads to incorrect decision making, but he 
seeks to go far beyond the implications of  management accounting for poor 
shop floor and product-pricing decisions. 
It is difficult to draw sweeping conclusions about the impacts of managerial 
accounting on a company’s profitability or a nation’s competitiveness. John- 
son obviously recognizes this, and therefore in  section 2.5 he  broadens his 
focus considerably. He speculates upon the sociological causes for the rise of 
“finance-driven, numbers-oriented‘’ managers, bound by  accounting systems 
that measure their businesses. Furthermore, he uses these ideas to explain the 
declining competitiveness of American business. While I find the discussion 
stimulating, a few pages cannot begin to prove Johnson’s arguments regarding 
the impacts of misguided business education, misused economic thinking, or 
the development of a new managerial mindset. 69  Managing by Remote Control 
In conclusion, Johnson’s paper is a valuable contribution that summarizes 
the changes in  management accounting systems over time and that lays out 
consequences of  using  poor and narrow  accounting measures. As Johnson 
turns his attention away from history and toward contemporary practice, he 
offers a provocative set of  assertions to account for perceived changes in the 
performance of American history. 
Johnson concludes by exhorting managers to pay attention to processes and 
people, not to financial accounting results. This advice, while intuitively ap- 
pealing, seems very difficult to implement. Even a perfect multidimensional 
measurement system-one  that correctly identifies long-term costs of  poor 
quality, customer dissatisfaction, or economic externalities-requires  rules to 
arbitrate how trade-offs will be made when inevitable conflicts arise. The ex- 
isting system, however flawed, adopts the perspective that financial reporting 
numbers are meaningful indicators of firm value, which in turn reflect some- 
thing about the wealth of  the owners of the enterprise. Incentive systems that 
tie managerial rewards directly to value creation as measured by stock prices 
avoid using imperfect accounting measures, but do so at the cost of introduc- 
ing a great deal of noise into the system. Giving managers instructions to take 
care of  people and processes, that is, to “do the right thing,” may provide 
managers insufficient guidance and may not result in value-maximizing be- 
havior. This Page Intentionally Left Blank